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Patrick Messmer 
PLS—Poirier 
May 6, 2013 
 
INNER CITIES, PRIVATE TO PRIVATE EMINENT DOMAIN TRANSFERS, AND PUBLIC 
FINANCING OF STADIUMS 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Barclay's Center, part of the Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project, was 
first proposed in December of 2003.   Focused primarily in the neighborhoods of Prospect 
Heights, Boerum Hill, Park Slope, and Fort Greene, the project garnered national attention both 
for its wealthy and glamorous proponents, including a Russian billionaire, New York real estate 
mogul, and famous rapper Jay-Z, as well as the series of controversial court cases that resulted 
from it.   
The plaintiffs took the position that the Barclay Center did not qualify as a public use 
under the meaning of eminent domain requirements.  The plaintiffs ultimately lost, both the 
lawsuits are their homes, but along the way the controversy eventually involved household 
names like Steve Buscemi, and generated a lot of discussion regarding what is and what is not a 
public use.   
This paper will consider stadiums constructed for professional sports teams, and more 
specifically, whether they constitute a public use by creating an economic benefit to the local 
community, ultimately concluding that no, stadiums have never proven themselves to be enough 
of a boon to the local economy to warrant the public use designation, regardless of what 
projections and estimates say.  Section II briefly discusses the history of eminent domain being 
used in inner cities, both for purposes of economic benefit and to gentrify blighted areas.  Section 
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III looks at whether we can ever consider a stadium as a public use for purposes of eminent 
domain, and whether there is any measureable positive economic impact on the local economy 
resulting from new stadium construction.  Section IV discusses the Barclay Center a little more 
at length, and uses it as a case study for both the economic effects of new stadium construction, 
and the effects that widespread use of eminent domain for gentrification purposes can have on 
neighborhood demographics.  Finally, Section V will conclude this paper.  
 
II. HISTORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN USED FOR INNER CITIES 
 
A.  Development 
 
Both the federal government and the states have the power of eminent domain.  The 
takings clause contains two important limitations: "private property shall not be taken for public 
use without just compensation."
1
  The language of the Fifth Amendment seems to limit the 
taking of private property to situations in which there is both a public use and just compensation 
for the property.  This of course begs the question, how do we define public use and just 
compensation.  There are typically two types of takings, physical and regulatory.
2
  This paper 
deals only with the former, or takings in which the government confiscates and physically 
occupies property, and in the case examined, evicts private individuals from their property. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002) ("The text of the 
Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a distinction between physical takings and regulatory 
takings."). 
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B.  Defining Public Use 
 
The Fifth Amendment requires that a taking be for public use,
3
 however, the Court has 
adopted a rather broad view of the definition of what constitutes a public use.  The Court has 
determined that a public use is anything that meets the rational basis test, i.e. if the government 
acts out of a reasonable belief that the taking is of benefit the public, then the public use 
requirement is satisfied.
4
  This was demonstrated as early as 1954, in Berman v. Parker, when 
the Court allowed the District of Columbia to acquire blighted private property and then resell it 
to private developers.
5
  In the majority opinion, Justice Douglas found that the police power 
granted the legislature the ability to declare what the public good is.
6
  He reasoned that the 
legislature was in a better position to determine what was in the best interest of the public than 
the judiciary.
7
  He further concluded that once it is within the purview of the legislature to make 
certain determinations, the legislature has the ability to use the takings power in order to realize 
the object of those determinations.
8
   
The Court had the opportunity to reaffirm these principles in Hawaii Housing Authority 
v. Midkiff.
9
  Rather than confiscate slums, the State of Hawaii confiscated property from 
comparatively wealthier individuals for the purposes of reselling the property to a much larger 
number of individuals.
10
  In a unanimous opinion, the Court found that the taking was 
permissible as a justified public use, because the Hawaii legislature's concern regarding too 
                                                 
3 See Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) ("[O]ne person's property may not be taken for the 
benefit of another person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid."). 
4 Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984) ("…where the exercise of the eminent domain power is 
rationally reltaed to a conveivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed 
by the Public Use Clause."). 
5 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
6 Id. at 32–33. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 33.  
9 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
10 Id. at 243. 
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much property being held by too few people valid legislative judgment that should be afforded 
great deference by the judiciary.
11
  The Court reaffirmed that the "public use requirement is thus 
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."
12
 
One of the most recent cases to address public use—and one of the most controversial 
Supreme Court cases of the last decade—was Kelo v. City of New London.13  In Kelo, a 
Connecticut city sought to bring about economic revitalization by confiscating private property 
and selling it to a private corporation that planned to build a new economic development 
project.
14
  A far cry from the unanimous Midkiff opinion, the Court split 5–4, ruling that the 
taking satisfied the public use requirement because the city reasonably believed that the new 
development project would create over 1,000 new jobs.
15
  This again reaffirmed the theory that 
any taking is for public use if the minimal standard of reasonable belief of public benefit is met.   
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, argues that eminent domain was not without 
limits, and that a taking would not be "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose"
16
 if the 
taking of private property is intended to benefit "particular, favored private entities" and confers 
no benefit on the public or merely "incidental or pretextual" benefits.
17
  Justice Kennedy 
continues, arguing that courts reviewing plausible accusations of favoritism should approach the 
issue with "the presumption that the government's actions were reasonable and intended to serve 
a public purpose."
18
  Under this approach, the economic revitalization plan passed constitutional 
muster because, as the lower courts found, the plan was intended to revitalize the local economy, 
                                                 
11 Id. at 241 ("[T]he Court has made it clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to 
what constitutes a public use unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation."). 
12 Id. at 240.  For a broader discussion of takings and the police power, see Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police 
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). 
13 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
14 Id. at 477. 
15 Id at 472. 
16 Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241). 
17 Id. at 490. 
18 Id. at 491. 
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and not merely to serve the interests of Pfizer, one of the main beneficiaries of the taking.
19
  
According to Kennedy, a presumption of invalidity—like the one argued for by the homeowners 
whose properties were confiscated—is not warranted by the mere fact that the purpose of the 
taking was economic development.
20
 
In dissent, Justice O'Connor argues that while the legislature should be afforded 
considerable deference regarding what governmental activities will advantage the public, the 
question of what constitutes a public use is a judicial one.
21
  According to Justice O'Connor, the 
takings in Berman and Midkiff remained true to underlying principles regarding legitimate public 
purposes, but the Kelo taking does not.
22
  The distinction exists in the "precondemnation use of 
the targeted property," which "afflicted affirmative harm on society—in Berman through blight 
resulting from extreme poverty and in Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme 
wealth."
23
   
In both cases, the respective legislatures determined that the best way to eliminate the 
affirmative societal harm was to confiscate the property, "[t]hus a public use was realized when 
the harmful use was eliminated."
24
  By this reasoning, the fact that the confiscated property was 
subsequently sold to private individuals is beside the point, since the taking itself directly 
achieved a public benefit.
25
  This is in sharp contrast to the Kelo taking, wherein the City of New 
London never claimed that Ms. Kelo's home was the source of social harm, only that it could be 
used differently by a new private owner in a manner that could produce some secondary benefit 
                                                 
19 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 492. 
20 Id. at 493. 
21 Id. at 497 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930)). 
22 Id. at 500. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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for the public.
26
  Justice O'Connor also objects to two implied limitations in the majority opinion, 
albeit not to their intended purpose, but to their effectiveness.  Also in dissent, Justice Thomas 
asserts that the Court's rulings have resulted in the Public Use Clause being essentially 
nullified.
27
   
 
C.  Blight Exception 
 
Eminent domain in the context of inner cities is often justified by declaring the properties 
to be condemned as blighted.  Definitions for blight include everything from traditional criteria 
such as abandoned and deteriorating buildings
28
 to modern criteria that include "too-small side 
yards, diverse ownership (different people own properties next to each other), inadequate 
planning, and lack of a two-car attached garaged."
29
  Blight determinations can doom whole 
neighborhoods even if the neighborhood contains both blighted and non-blighted properties.
30
   
One theory of what should constitute blight focuses on taking an economic approach, i.e. 
that a blighted property is one which produces a negative externality on neighboring properties.
31
  
The premise here is that properties that are dilapidated or in great disrepair deter businesses from 
investing in the community and increase the likelihood of criminal activity.
32
   
                                                 
26 Id. at 501. 
27 Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
28 Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases 
and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 55 (2006) (citing Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of 
Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 
1034 (2005) ("Early blight cases in the 1940s and 1950s upheld condemnations in areas that closely fit the 
layperson's intuitive notion of 'blight': dilapidated, dangerous, disease-ridden neighborhoods.")). 
29 Id. at 55.  
30 See, e.g., Berman, 348 U.S. at 34–35 (Berman's department store while not itself blighted, was in a neighborhood 
in which over 60% of properties were beyond repair.  The Court made a determination that it would not question the 
legislature's decision to treat the neighborhood as a whole rather than make determinations for each individual 
property.). 
31 Kelly, supra note 28, at 55. 
32 Id. at 55–56 (citing William T. Nachbaur, Empty Houses: Abandoned Residential Buildings in the Inner City, 17 
HOW. L.J. 3 (1971); and citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 ("[m]iserable and disreputable housing conditions . . . spread 
disease and crime"). 
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There is little argument against blight being used as a proper justification for eminent 
domain.
33
  However, concern exists over when and why blight determinations are made, and 
whether the legislature could abuse the judicial deference that a blight determination warrants by 
using a finding of neighborhood blight "as a pretext for using eminent domain for economic 
development."
34
  This type of eminent domain abuse can condemn "productive businesses and 
inhabited homes with no obvious characteristics of blight."
35
   
Indeed, this is one of the concerns in the Barclay Center case, discussed below.
36
  These 
concerns for abuse are especially prevalent in inner city eminent domain use, where there is 
always at least the suspicion that "blight" is just code for "black," and that legislatures simply 
find it easier to declare an area blighted and sell it to private developers rather than address the 
root causes of the alleged blight.   
 
 
III. STADIUMS AS PUBLIC USE 
 
  
 A.  Previous Instances of Eminent Domain Condemnations for Stadium Construction 
 
Eminent domain has been involved with sports stadiums since at least as early as 1959, 
when Los Angeles promised the Brooklyn Dodgers
37
 that the city would guarantee the team 
some amount of land that it already possessed and promised to use its best efforts to obtain 
additional acreage if the team moved west.
38
  When the contract was challenged, the California 
                                                 
33 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the extreme blight present in Berman made for a 
clear and affirmative social harm, which warranted judicial deference to how the legislature felt it best to remedy 
said harm).  
34 Kelly, supra note 28, at 57; see also Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, 
and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (2004). 
35 Id. 
36 See infra, Section IV. 
37 The Brooklyn Dodgers, now the Los Angeles Dodgers, are a Major League Baseball franchise. 
38 City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 333 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1959). 
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Supreme Court held that the use of eminent domain for the purpose of immediately transferring 
the land to the Dodgers was a valid public purpose in the sense that it allowed the city to have the 
ability to enter into a contract which it deemed advantageous to the public interest.
39
  This 
however, did not settle the eminent domain question, as the court decided the case on principles 
of contract law, since the contract in question did not require that the city use eminent domain, 
only that it attempt to acquire the properties (which could also include voluntary purchase 
contracts), and thus the court did not feel the need to reach the question of whether this would 
have been a valid use of eminent domain.
40
   
California later came much closer to directly addressing the relationship between 
stadiums and eminent domain when a California appeals court determined that the City of 
Anaheim could condemn land surrounding the existing stadium of the Anaheim Angels, another 
MLB franchise, in order to build a parking lot.
41
  The appeals court framed the public use as 
"reliev[ing] congestion and reduc[ing] traffic hazards," which is a valid public purpose.
42
   
The Arlington City Council, on behalf of another professional baseball team in need of a 
parking lot, the Texas Rangers, condemned land around the existing stadium.
43
  Citing deference 
to the legislature, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the taking as a proper use of eminent 
domain.
44
   
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Id. at 752. 
40 Id. at 753. 
41 City of Anaheim v. Michel, 259 Cal. App. 2d 835, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 
42 Id. 
43 City of Arlington v. Golddust Twins Realty Corp., 41 F.3d 960 (5th Cir. 1994). 
44 Id. at 966. 
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B.  The Measurable Economic Benefit Debate 
One of the most cited justifications for public subsidies for new arena construction is that 
the local economy will get a boost from construction, increased spending, and more jobs (which 
in turn is how cities and states satisfy the rational basis test.
45
  As this section will demonstrate, 
this is rarely, if ever, the case.  The economists Robert Baade and Allen Sanderson have done 
extensive work focusing on stadium financing and effects, and one of the major problems they 
encounter that is not addressed by stadium construction proponents, is what type of industry 
professional sports is.
46
   
Professional sports are not like manufacturing or other "export" industries, but rather are 
more comparable to the service and entertainment industries.
47
  New positive economic benefits 
are created when industries and businesses export a product to another region, which brings in 
"new" money to the local economy.
48
  This is in contrast to non-export industries, like 
entertainment, that attract mostly local spending, and tend to make money at the expense of 
another entertainment option.
49
  That is, a local economy has a finite number of entertainment 
dollars to spend in a given time period, and new forms of available entertainment compete with 
existing ones for those entertainment dollars.   
The overall effect of this is that any spending at a new stadium is not necessarily "new" 
spending, but is merely the same spending in a new location.  The impact of this is that rather 
                                                 
45 Robert Baade, Professional Sports as Catalysts for Metropolitan Economic Development, 18 J. OF URBAN 
AFFAIRS 1 (1996) ("Taxpayers are told that professional sports stadiums and teams will enrich rather than deplete 
local treasuries and that paying for profssional sports now will mitigate future tax burdens by stimulating local job 
creation and incomes."). 
46 Robert A. Baade & Allen R. Sanderson, The Employment Effects of Teams and Sports Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS 
AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS, 92, 101 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew 
Zimbalist, eds., 1997). 
47 Id. 
48 Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS AND 
TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS, supra note 46, at 65. 
49 Id.  
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than producing new spending in a local economy, stadiums often have the effect of taking away 
spending from other local businesses, i.e. people might now spend their entertainment dollars at 
the sporting event rather than at the local mall or restaurant.  In fact, in a 1987 study, seven of the 
nine cities examined after stadium construction or renovation, received a reduced share of 
regional income.
50
  In none of the nine cities studied was a positive correlation found between 
"stadiums, professional sports, and city income as a fraction of regional income.”51  New 
entertainment choices can be a good thing, but should not be mistaken for something that creates 
new value when it only serves to dilute the already-existing entertainment market. 
The stadium advocate will respond that unlike local malls and restaurants, stadiums can 
increase tourism, thus acting as a quasi-export business by bringing in truly new money.  The 
estimations of increased tourism are often greatly exaggerated, and in fact the large majority of 
people who attend sporting events are locals.
52
  For sake of covering all of our bases, it should 
also be noted that the "non-attendance-based revenue," which includes things like broadcasting, 
television deals, and merchandise sales, have also not been shown to generate enough of an 
impact on local economies to offset the loss of revenue to other local entertainment options.
53
  
Evidently, this is due in large part to the bulk of professional sports team revenues being used to 
fund continued operations of the team, e.g. paying for staff, coaches, and players.
54
  In addition, 
coaches and players, the biggest beneficiaries of team revenues aside from owners, tend to not 
                                                 
50 ROBERT A. BAADE, THE HEARTLAND INST., IS THERE AN ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR SUBSIDIZING SPORTS 
STADIUMS? 15 (1987), available at 
http://news.heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/pdfs/17280.pdf (Note that Baade 
included a population variable in each regression model in his study, in order to control for the possibility that 
economic performance dropped as a result of factors better ascribed to "general urban malaise" or urban income 
contraction.  Therefore, to complete lack of positive correlation should be entirely attributable to the construction of 
the stadium(s), and should not be the fault of being wrapped up in an otherwise poor economy.). 
51 Id. at 16. 
52 Noll, supra note 48, at 69. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 72. 
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live in the neighborhoods in which their respective stadiums are located, and therefore much of 
the team revenue does not stay in the local economy.
55
 
The second response of the stadium advocate is that regardless of increased spending 
claims, at least the stadium will bring in new jobs.  This too tends to be greatly exaggerated.
56
  
Studies commissioned by teams when submitting their construction proposals tend to not take 
into account already-existing jobs at the facilities that the new stadiums will be replacing.
57
  
These studies fail to differentiate between "net" and "gross" gains in employment.
58
  In order for 
all of the jobs "created" by the new stadium to be new ones, the city would have to have no 
professional athletic team before the stadium was constructed.
59
   
Another important thing to note regarding job creation is that the vast majority of the jobs 
are low-paying seasonal employments.
60
  According to Baade and Sanderson, roughly 2% of the 
jobs counted as being created by the stadium are full-time and high-paying—this 2% of course 
being the players, coaching staff, and team management.
61
  So even if a stadium can be said to 
create new jobs at all, approximately 98% of those "new" jobs are seasonal service industry jobs 
that offer irregular hours, low pay, and likely little to no benefits.   
Finally, in case one might think that having a dozen to several dozen new 
multimillionaires in the form of professional athletes spending money in the local economy 
might be a good thing, Baade and Sanderson put that theory to rest as well.  In contrast to the 
image of high-rolling athletes portrayed by the media, players and coaches tend to save and 
                                                 
55 Id. at 73. 
56 Baade & Sanderson, supra note 46, at 92. 
57 Id. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 94. 
60 Id. at 99. 
61 Id. 
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invest a higher percentage of their income relative to comparable earners.
62
  This could be 
because of the highly volatile nature of sports, in that careers of players are often very short, and 
coaching turnover is often very high.
63
 
 
 
IV. THE CASE OF THE BARCLAY’S CENTER 
 
  
A.  Background 
 
The Barclay's Center, part of the Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project, was 
first proposed in December of 2003.
64
  The plans called for 22 acres of new development in 
Brooklyn, New York, in the center of the Prospect Heights, Boerum Hill, Park Slope, and Fort 
Greene neighborhoods.
65
  In order to acquire 22 acres of developable land in an area as densely 
built up as Brooklyn, the Empire State Development Corporation (hereinafter "ESDC") planned 
to use eminent domain.
66
  Opponents of the plan claimed that the confiscation of 53 properties, 
displacing 330 residents and 33 businesses, was too high of a price to pay for the land to be sold 
off to private developers for a new sports arena and skyscrapers.
67
   
The development project was slated to "extend eastward from the junction of Atlantic and 
Flatbush Avenues, and include blocks [then] occupied by the subgrade Vanderbilt rail and MTA 
bus yards as well as certain blocks bordering the yards to the south."
68
  Set to be completed in 
phases, the Barclay's Center was the first project on the docket.
69
  Throughout various other 
phases, the project includes infrastructure upgrades to the Vanderbilt Yards rail facilities, a mix 
                                                 
62 Baade & Sanderson, supra note 46, at 102. 
63 Id. 
64 Mark Berkey-Gerard, Eminent Domain Revisited, GOTHAM GAZETTE, Dec. 12, 2005, 
http://old.gothamgazette.com/article/iotw/20051212/200/1678.   
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 165 (N.Y. 2009). 
69 Id.  
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of commercial and residential high rise structures, and some eight acres of publicly accessible 
open space.
70
 
One of the most prevalent objections to this type of eminent domain use was the 
determination of blight.
71
  One such objection came from Dan Goldstein.
72
  Mr. Goldstein argues 
that the ESDC's blight designation for his neighborhood is misleading.
73
  As evidence, Mr. 
Goldstein points to the fact that he paid nearly $600,000 for his newly renovated condominium 
in the Prospect Heights neighborhood in 2003.
74
  The blight declaration was based on a 2006 
report commissioned by the ESDC.
75
  The report pointed to several factors when making its 
determination, including below-grade railways of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
(hereinafter "MTA"), weeds and graffiti, and the economic "underutilization" of the soon-to-be-
confiscated land.
76
 
After several years of litigation, Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. visited the 
New York Court of Appeals for the last time.
77
  Primarily at issue was the determination issued 
by the New York State Urban Development Corporation, d/b/a ESDC, that it should confiscate 
the properties contained within the 22 acre area.
78
  The project was termed a "land use 
improvement project."
79
  The petitioners in Goldstein do not dispute that the "blight" designation 
for more than 50% of the confiscated property is appropriate.
80
  Where the dispute did arise, 
however, was in a roughly three-block area wherein there had been no previous blight-
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 See Nicole Gelinas, The Empire State and Eminent Domain, THE WALL STREET J., Nov. 13, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704576204574530161194721796.html. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 AKRF, INC., ATLANTIC YARDS ARENA AND REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT: BLIGHT STUDY (2006). 
76 Id. at A-1.   
77 Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 164. 
78 Id. at 165. 
79 Id. at 166. 
80 Id.  
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designation prior to the Atlantic Yards Project.
81
  The Forest City Ratner Companies (hereinafter 
"FCRC"), the main private developer associated with the project, had already successfully 
acquired many of the properties in the area, but petitioners either refused to sell, felt they were 
entitled to more money, or argued that the state did not have the right to confiscate their property 
if it was not blighted.
82
  The ESDC claimed that the report "made findings that the blocks in 
which [the petitioners] are situated possess sufficient indicia of actual or impending blight to 
warrant their condemnation for clearance and redevelopment" in accordance with the land use 
improvement plan.
83
  It was the position of the ESDC that, by "removing blight" and instituting 
the proposed redevelopment plan in its place, the "public use, benefit or purpose" requirement 
under New York State law would be satisfied.
84
 
A federal court had already rejected the claims made by the petitioners regarding the 
Fifth Amendment and whether the proposed land use improvement plan was properly considered 
public use, however, the federal district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the New York State constitutional claims.
85
  The Court of Appeals rejects the petitioners' 
assertion that their property was not being condemned for public use as the state constitution 
required, but rather was being condemned to "enable a private commercial entity to use their 
properties for private economic gain with, perhaps, some incidental public benefit."
86
  The court 
emphatically rejects this, writing that it is "indisputable that the removal of urban blight is a 
proper and, indeed, constitutionally sanctioned, predicate for the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain."
87
   
                                                 
81 Id. 
82 Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 166. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 166–67 (citing Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
86 Id. at 170. 
87 Id. at 170–71. 
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In response to petitioners' biggest gripe—that while the rail yards and other areas were 
blighted, the three-block area wherein petitioners lived or worked, were not—the court gives in 
to an extent, saying that "[t]hey are doubtless correct that the conditions cited in support of the 
blight finding at issue do not begin to approach in severity the dire circumstances of urban slum 
dwelling."
88
  But the court reasons its way around this: "We, however, have never required that a 
finding of blight by a legislatively designated public benefit corporation be based upon 
conditions replicating those" of the 1936 case that spawned the "substandard and insanitary" 
definition of urban blight in New York.
89
   
As early as the 1950s, the Court of Appeals found that "[o]f course, none of the buildings 
are as noisome or dilapidated as those described in Dickens' novels . . . but there is ample in this 
record to justify the determination of the city planning commission that a substantial part of the 
area is 'substandard and insanitary' by modern tests."
90
 The court goes on to explain that while 
historically, slums were the primary target of the substandard and insanitary language, as the 
complexities of modern urban societies have become better understood, it is clear that 
condemnation for the public welfare is not limited to slums, and instead also includes areas of 
economic underdevelopment and stagnation.
91
 
Perhaps most frustrating for the petitioners, the Court of Appeals contends that it would 
be quite easy to disagree with the blight findings of the ESDC, but that such a contention would 
merely be another reasonable view of the evidence, and since this is something that is left to 
legislative prerogative, the petitioners are without recourse.
92
  Indeed, the court goes on:  
                                                 
88 Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 171. 
89 Id. (citing 1938 Rep. of N.Y. Constitutional Convention Comm., vol. 6, part 2, at 636–639). 
90 Id. (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953)). 
91 Id. at 171–72 (quoting Yonkers Community Dev.Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (1975)). 
92 Id. at 172. 
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It may be that the bar has not been set too low—that what will now 
pass as "blight," as that expression has come to be understood and 
used by political appointees to public corporations relying upon 
studies paid for by developers, should not be permitted to 
constitute a predicate for the invasion of property rights and the 
razing of homes and businesses.  But any such limitation upon the 
sovereign power of eminent domain as it has come to be defined in 
the urban renewal context is a matter for the Legislature, not the 
courts.
93
 
 
The court even admits that the concept of public use has been "sapped" of its limiting power.
94
  
Regardless, the project was deemed a public use, and the next section will consider if one exists 
at all, and what the consequences of the project have been so far. 
 
 B.  Consequences of the Project 
  
1.  Dueling Reports: Economic Impact 
 
The first consideration is whether there will indeed be a measureable economic benefit 
from the construction of the Barclay Center.  Perhaps not surprisingly, given the amazing 
historical ability of stadium projects to garner incredible amounts of public funding, the Barclay 
Center and related phases of the Atlantic Yards Project were the beneficiaries of large public 
subsidization.
95
  Even leaving aside the use of eminent domain powers on its behalf, Mr. Ratner's 
development project received an additional $300 million in city rent subsidies, $114 million in 
tax exempt Liberty Bonds despite not actually being located in Lower Manhattan,
96
 and then 
another $400 million in Liberty Bonds once Mr. Ratner could not find enough tenants to fill all 
of the office space planned.
97
  All of this was warranted, according to Mr. Ratner, because any 
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expenditures made by the city on his behalf would be more than repaid by the "surge of resulting 
tax revenues."
98
 
 In a report financed by Ratner, an economist
99
 estimated that the Project would generate 
$1.5 billion in new revenues, as opposed to $700 million in new costs.
100
  Notable, however, is 
that even in this pro-project study, the Barclay Center was only estimated to account for 
approximately $257 million in new revenues.
101
  Note that even with this estimate, low relative 
to the rest of the projections, there are large issues regarding methodology.  The study assumes, 
incorrectly in my opinion, that 30% of fans attending Nets games will be from New Jersey, and 
therefore represent "new" money in the local economy.
102
  While there are no New Jersey-
specific figures regarding game attendance yet,
103
 there are three problems with the estimate as 
formulated by the Ratner report.   
The estimates are in part based off of the percentage of non-season ticket holders who 
attended New York Jets games at the Meadowlands in New Jersey, but who live in New York.
104
  
There are a few of reasons why the analogy is inapplicable: 1) the more infrequent football 
schedule makes it more acceptable to be an all day affair; 2) many Jets fans are historically from 
Queens and Long Island, i.e. there are very strong territorial loyalties to the franchise whereas 
the Nets do not enjoy such a rabid and loyal fan base; and, 3) a fact of life of living in New York 
City is that the only professional football around is in New Jersey, which forces fans of both 
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teams to cross state lines every Sunday if they want to see the game live, which is not the case 
for basketball.
105
  This is important because it shows that New York residents are 
overrepresented at football games compared to basketball games.   
By overvaluing the percentage of New Yorkers who travel to New Jersey as a means of 
estimating how many New Jersey residents would travel to Brooklyn, the report's estimate could 
be significantly off base.
106
  As an opposition report issued by economists from Columbia 
University and the London School of Economics in response to the Ratner report documents, the 
overvaluing of New York football attendees leads to the undervaluing of the number of New 
Jersey fans that attended Nets games while they were in New Jersey.
107
  The crux of this mistake 
is that there were fewer New York-based Nets fans prior to the move to Brooklyn than Ratner 
estimated, which is important in the sense that this "places a greater burden on NY-based fans in 
terms of fan attendance."
108
   
This is a serious concern, given that the out of state attendance numbers counted for 
much of the report's lofty revenue projections.  "In revenue terms, a greater share will be diverted 
from existing sales taxable expenditure in New York,"
109
 which means that we are taken back to 
the discussion regarding whether or not stadium spending is "new" spending, or whether it is 
simply taking entertainment dollars from other local businesses.  This is a huge blow to the 
Barclay Center project, which was relying on sales tax revenues to account for 60% of its 
projected new tax revenues.
110
  The opposition report goes on to discuss the arena's effects on the 
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local economy specifically.  Indeed, it shows that the total gain to the city is $257.5 million, but 
the cost of the arena to the city and state is $261 million.
111
 
Given that we are operating without the benefit of economic data or hindsight, the smart 
money appears to be on either no economic impact, or a negative economic impact.  The next 
section will turn to the social side of the project, namely, the consequences of the use of eminent 
domain on the ethnic profile of the affected neighborhoods. 
 
2.  Changing Landscapes: Neighborhood Profiles Pre- and Post-Barclay Center 
The Barclay Center sits at the nexus of Prospect Heights, Fort Greene, Park Slope, and 
Boerum Hill.  As would be expected, these neighborhoods were the most affected by the Atlantic 
Yards Project.  In order to see if any ethnic groups were more affected by the redevelopment 
than others, I examined census data and measured neighborhood population changes between 
2000 and 2010.   
Brooklyn as a whole increased its population by less than 40,000 residents, at the same 
time losing its relative share of New York City's total residents, from 30.8% to 30.6%.
112
  The 
rest of the city outpaced Brooklyn's population growth, with the city as a whole averaging 2.2% 
growth.
113
  Interesting, the Barclay Center neighborhoods correlate with either zero or negative 
population growth:  Prospect Heights and Park Slope both saw approximately no change, while 
the Boerum Hill and Fort Greene neighborhoods both saw losses of 1,000–5,000 (equating to 
losses of 5–10%).114 
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While NYC as a whole saw a net loss of nonhispanic whites of -2.8%, Brooklyn saw a 
4.5% increase in the number of nonhispanic whites.
115
  Concurrently, and perhaps relatedly, 
Brooklyn had a larger percent decrease of black populations than the city as a whole: -5.8% and -
5.1%, respectively.
116
  Where black and white nonhispanics were in roughly equal proportions in 
2000, by 2010 there was a 5% advantage to whites.  Brooklyn also had enormous relative losses 
of Pacific Islander (-21.2%), other race nonhispanics (-33.8%), and mixed race nonhispanics 
(41.8%).   
Tellingly, the Boerum Hill-Downtown area saw a 55% increase in white nonhispanics.
117
  
Prospect Heights saw a 60+% gain in nonhispanic whites, while Fort Greene and Park Slope had 
a more humble 10–20% increase.118  As should be becoming clear, there is growing evidence 
that as the Barclay Center drove up real estate values, it began pricing economically 
disadvantaged minorities out of the market.  The vast majority of Brooklyn neighborhoods had 
either no growth or negative growth in nonhispanic whites, but all of the neighborhoods 
surrounding the arena had significant positive growth as a percentage of their populations. 
As we expand our gaze to other ethnic groups, the pattern becomes even more apparent.  
Park Slope and Fort Greene both lost the most Hispanics of any neighborhood in New York City, 
between -20 and -40%.
119
  Boerum Hill also lost 10–19%.  Fort Greene's black nonhispanic 
population plummeted 32%, with Prospect Hill and Park Slope experiencing similar losses, and 
Boerum Hill seeing a slightly less drastic but still undeniable 10–19% drop.120  Asian 
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populations actually grew by an amazing amount from 2000 to 2010, increasing by 40%, but 
little to none of those gains were made in any of the four Barclay neighborhoods.
121
  
In sum: each of the four Barclay neighborhoods lost at least 11% of Hispanics (with Park 
Slope setting the high mark of -32%, the most in all of New York City); with the exception of 
Boerum Hill, which lost a still significant 18%, each of the neighborhoods lost at least 31% of 
black nonhispanics (with Prospect Heights losing the most at -38%, good for the third highest 
change in the city).  Meanwhile, Park Slope added just under a 20% increase in nonhispanic 
whites, and each of the other three neighborhoods saw more than a 55% increase (with Fort 
Greene at an unbelievable 82%).  While the numbers standing alone speak for themselves, they 
are even starker in the context of Brooklyn as a whole.  
While this probably is not the intent of the project, fixing "blight" has long been 
understood to refer to gentrifying an area.  With gentrification there are natural side effects, 
including increased property values.  In an area like Brooklyn, with property values already quite 
high, the new arena likely just pushed low income earners over the edge and they were forced to 
look for more affordable housing elsewhere.  Obviously it should be a goal of cities to improve 
the quality of their neighborhoods, but doing it in such a way as to almost guarantee breaking up 
neighborhoods with cultural ties seems problematic.  
Perhaps we could even look past this ugly side effect if stadiums really were the white 
knight of inner cities, and brought significant and lasting economic improvement, but the 
evidence is very much against that proposition.  Everything we know about inner city stadiums 
leads us to believe that they do not measurably improve economic quality or performance in a 
city.  In fact, they often reduce economic performance relative to the rest of the region, largely 
due to the fact that stadiums encourage the development of service industry laborers, as opposed 
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to more skilled and thus higher paid manufacturing workers that are present in a healthy export 
industry.  Despite this, cities use stadiums again and again in an attempt to "upzone" their poorer 
districts.
122
 
 
 
C.  Might the Barclay Center be Different? 
If ever there were a project for the pro-stadium advocate to hang his hat on, the Atlantic 
Yards Project just might be it.  There are several characteristics about it that could potentially 
prove to be the difference maker in the public use argument: 1) the Barclay Center is a new 
stadium, rather than merely replacing or upgrading an older one; 2) the Barclay Center is 
immediately adjacent to a major transportation hub; 3) that transportation hub underwent major 
renovations as a part of the Atlantic Yards Project; 4) the complex is smack dab in the middle of 
one of the most densely populated residential areas in the country; and 5) as the city generally 
prides itself on, there is always a chance that the New York City market will be different. 
The first point was addressed above,
123
 in that although the Barclay Center is indeed a 
new stadium, and therefore can claim to be bringing new jobs into the local economy, any jobs 
that it does manage to bring will be low-value service seasonal service industry jobs.  
Furthermore, without enough data gathered regarding the Brooklyn Nets' move from Newark's 
Prudential Center to the Barclay Center, is it not clear how the economic figures will be affected 
since the move was a relatively small one.  Finally, as stated above,
124
 it is unlikely that simply 
building a stadium will bring additional revenue and spending into a local economy, even if it is 
a brand new stadium and not merely a replacement, because stadiums are simply competing for 
the finite amount of entertainment dollars.  In fact, the argument could be made that this is 
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especially the case in a city like New York, where there are an overwhelming number of 
entertainment options trying to woo dollars away from consumers. 
The second and third points, regarding the Barclay Center being immediately adjacent to 
the Atlantic Avenue station, which services both NYC subway lines as well as the LIRR, is a 
strong one for the success of the stadium.  I will concede that being next to a large transportation 
hub, especially one that is newly renovated, is a major advantage to winning the entertainment 
dollar battle.  However, again we are left to consider that the economic success promised by Mr. 
Ratner was promised to Brooklyn as a whole; he did not merely promise that the stadium would 
be successful.  Part of the reason that politicians and the public are both fond of the idea of 
building new stadiums with public money may well be because many stadiums are very 
successful—it is very easy to point to Madison Square Garden and talk about the amount of 
revenue it brings in annually.  In reality, the problem is not that stadiums and arenas are not 
successful, but rather that they are successful at the expense of other local businesses.  This is 
why cities see the drop in relative regional income after they build new stadiums.
125
   
As for being in the middle of a residential area, I again concede that this may be helpful 
to the success of the stadium, however, see above regarding success of the stadium versus 
success of the city.  Furthermore, it is not clear that the Barclay Center will remain at the center 
of a residential hub.  With property prices rising rapidly, it is possible, if not likely, that many of 
the families currently in the neighborhood will be forced to move farther away, or to a different 
part of town, in an effort to locate affordable housing.  Mr. Ratner may respond by saying that he 
intended to offset these obvious effects of his development project, and indeed he seemed to 
imply as much when the Ratner financed report proudly announced that the project would be 
implementing a "new 50/50" model for the housing units, i.e. half will be rented at below market 
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value, and half at market value.
126
  What the report doesn’t make mention of is that included in 
this figure are only half of the 4500 apartments that will be for rent, and none of the 2000 
condominiums.
127
  Moreover, many of the "affordable" apartments would cost $2,000 a month or 
more, which can hardly be called housing for low to middle income families.
128
  In fact, as much 
as 84% of the 6800+ planned units of housing would go to households that earn more than the 
neighborhood's median income.
129
 
Finally, as the fifth possibility for the Barclay Center being an exception to the general 
rule that stadium constriction is a drain on the local economy, that of New York City simply 
being different, this might be true.  Although not in the way proponents of the stadium would 
like.  New York City has so many entertainment choices, that the Nets may have to fight tooth 
and nail to win those entertainment dollars.  Of course, they may benefit from being in Brooklyn, 
which has the population of Manhattan, but not necessarily as many distractions in terms of 
professional sports-type entertainment alternatives.  This is not at all a definite, however,  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Only time will tell if the Atlantic Yards Project is an economic success in terms of 
increasing spending and general welfare in Brooklyn.  At this writing, all I can do is offer 
speculation.  I predict, without reservation, that the Barclay Center will go the way to every other 
stadium before it, offering either no net change or negative change to Brooklyn taxpayers.  
Hopefully, if the Barclay Center proves to be no different from the dozens of other stadiums 
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before it, this debate will finally put to rest the ever-popular contention that publicly-subsidizing 
arenas, be it through tax breaks or private to private eminent domain transfers, is not a boon to 
local taxpayers.  If there is no economic benefit to building the arena, and the effect of using 
eminent domain in private to private transfers is to immediately gentrify an area, which seems to 
be code for "whiten culturally diverse neighborhoods," then it is difficult to imagine exactly what 
public use a stadium brings to the table, and therefore how it could satisfy even the minimal 
rational basis test.  Surely though, the next one will be different. 
